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QUESTION PRESENTED
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
held in an action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, that a plaintiff may ordinarily
prove the existence of an unlawful motive by establishing a prima facie case and demonstrating the
falsity of the employer’s proffered explanation for the
disputed employment, and that a plaintiff who does
so need not also offer some other additional evidence
of discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit held in this
Title VII action that the existence of an unlawful
motive may not be established in that manner; a
plaintiff who establishes a prima facie case and the
falsity of an employer’s proffered reason is required to
also adduce additional evidence of discrimination.
The question presented is:
Does the standard of proof established by Reeves
apply in a Title VII action?
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PARTIES
The petitioner is Charles Flowers.
The respondents are the Troup County, Georgia,
School District, Dr. Cole Pugh, individually and in his
official capacity as Superintendent of the Troup
County School District, John Radcliffe, individually
and in his official capacity as Assistant Superintendent of the Troup County School District, Ted Alford,
individually and in his capacity as a member of the
Board of Education of Troup County, Debbie Burdette, individually and in her capacity as a member of
the Board of Education of Troup County, and Rev.
Allen Simpson, individually and in his capacity as a
member of the Board of Education of Troup County.

ooo
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Petitioner Charles Flowers respectfully prays
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment and opinions of the United States Court of
Appeals entered on October 16, 2015.

OPINIONS BELOW
The October 16, 2015, opinion of the court of
appeals, which is reported at 803 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir.
2015), is set out at pp. 1a-27a of the Appendix. The
March 5, 2014, opinion of the district court, which is
reported at 1 F.Supp.3d 1363 (N.D.Ga. 2014), is set
out at pp. 28a-70a of the Appendix. The Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation of December 26,
2013, which is not reported, is set out at pp. 71a-126a
of the Appendix. The December 11, 2015, order of the
court of appeals is set out at pp. 127a-30a of the
Appendix.

JURISDICTION
The decisions of the court of appeals were entered on October 16, 2015. A timely petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on
December 11, 2015. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a), provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 1981 of 42 U.S.C. provides in pertinent
part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... "
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."

STATEMENT
This case presents a question of fundamental
importance to the resolution of the thousands of Title

VII cases that are brought each year in federal and
state court.
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,
530 U.S. 133 (2000), this Court set out, in a case
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), a general standard for resolving discrimination claims. Reeves held that a plaintiff can ordinarily demonstrate the existence of an unlawful
motive by establishing a prima facie case and by
showing that the employer’s proffered explanation for
the disputed action is false. Reeves expressly rejected
a line of cases which had held that a plaintiff, over
and above proving that the employer lied about its
motives, must also adduce some additional evidence
of discrimination, a requirement that in practice had
often been impossible to meet.
Since 2000 the courts of appeals have generally
agreed that the Reeves standard applies to cases
arising under Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination cases. At one time the Eleventh Circuit also held that a Title VII plaintiff could demonstrate the existence of an unlawful purpose by
establishing a prima facie case and by showing that
the employer’s proffered explanation for the disputed
action is false. But in the avowedly precedent-setting
decision below, the Eleventh Circuit emphatically
repudiated its own earlier Title VII precedent, and
now insists that a plaintiff must also produce additional evidence. This is precisely the "additional evidence" requirement that was expressly rejected by
this Court in Reeves, and that all other circuits in the
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wake of Reeves have repeatedly refused to impose in
Title VII actions.
A. Legal Background
This Court’s decision in Reeves addressed in the
context of the ADEA the general standard governing
proof of discrimination in employment. "[A] plaintiff’s
prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer’s asserted justification is false,
may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the
employer unlawfully discriminated." 530 U.S. at 148.
"JR]ejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination." 530 U.S. at 147 (emphasis in original) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). Reeves expressly
rejected the lower court decisions which had held that
proof of such falsity is never sufficient, and that a
plaintiff always must both demonstrate that the
employer’s account was a lie (a pretext) and offer
some additional proof of discrimination. (That requirement is referred to in the lower courts as the
"pretext-plus" rule.1) "[B]ecause a prima facie case
1 Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232,
1240 (10th Cir. 2002):
IT]he Supreme Court in o.. Reeves cleared away a circuit split over the so-called "pretext-plus" theory
which said that a jury’s rejection of an employer’s
proffered explanation could not, by itself, suffice to
show discriminatory motive .... The Supreme Court ...
explain[ed] that [its prior precedent] forbade summary
(Continued on following page)

and sufficient evidence to reject the employer’s explanation may permit a finding of liability, the court of
appeals erred in proceeding from the premise that a
plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination." 530 U.S. at 149.
This Court has on a number of occasions cautioned that the standard of proof governing claims
under the ADEA might differ from the standard
appropriate in Title VII cases.2 Nonetheless, unlike
the precedent-setting Eleventh Circuit decision in the
instant case, the other circuit courts have consistently applied the Reeves standard to Title VII claims.
B. Factual Background
1. The First Investigation of Flowers
Troup County is a racially diverse county on the
western border of Georgia. About one third of the
population, and a higher percentage of the public
school students, is African-American. Between the
desegregation of the public schools in 1973, and the
summer of 2010, every head football coach at the
county’s three high schools was white. App. 5a.
judgment for a defendant where the plaintiff, after
presenting a prima facie case, presented evidence that
the defendant’s proffered explanation was pretextual.
2 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142; Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
557 U.S. 167, 174-79 (2009); Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544
U.S. 228, 240-42 (2005); O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996).
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Charles Flowers, a black alumnus of one of the
Troup County high schools, is one of the most successful
high school coaches in the state. Prior to the events
giving rise to this litigation, "Flowers distinguished
himself at [a] High School in Columbus, Georgia,
winning multiple coach-of-the-year awards and state
championships in baseball and football." App. 4a.
When there was a vacancy in the position of head
football coach at Troup High School, the black assistant principal in charge of athletics contacted Flowers
and invited him to apply for the position.
Flowers applied for the position and volunteered
to work without pay beginning in early 2010, running
both the high school’s spring football program and
summer weight camp. "Seven months before he was
officially hired, ... [school] administrators subjected
[Flowers] to an unusually intensive background
check, with a particular focus on discovering any
potential recruiting violations." The reason for this
unusual lengthy investigation of Flowers is a matter
of dispute. App. 5a. "After that investigation came up
empty, Troup County School District confirmed Flowers’s employment." Id.
2. The Second Investigation of Flowers
In the summer of 2010, the School Board received
the first of several letters from officials in neighboring Lanett, Alabama, just across the state line. The
letters asserted that a number of students who actually lived in Lanett had improperly enrolled at Troup
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High School, with the intent of playing on that high
school’s sports teams. App. 6a. The first three letters
only addressed the issue of where the students actually lived, and did not mention any possible involvement of Troup school officials.3 A fourth letter commented somewhat equivocally that the students "may
or may not have been recruited," apparently referring
to recruitment by someone in Troup County.4 These
letters did not prompt Troup School Board officials to
take any action related to Flowers at that time.
On February 1, 2011, a new County Superintendent of Education, Cole Pugh, took office.5 "On his
first day of work, Superintendent Pugh met with the
principal of Troup High School, who alleged that
Pugh told him that Pugh ’understood [Flowers] was a
recruiter.’ The principal denied that Flowers was a
recruiter, Push responded that he has ’learned that
where there’s smoke, there’s fire.’" App. 7a. Pugh
denied making that statement. App. 87a n.20. Pugh
"directed that an investigation be made into suspected recruiting violations committed by Flowers ....
[I]n April 2011, the Troup County School Board
hired a private investigator ... to look into allegations
of recruiting violations made against Flowers."
App. 7a. The detective’s particular assignment was
to investigate any possible "recruiting violations by
3 Doc. 133-1, Letters 1-3.
4 Doc. 133-1, Letter 4.
~ Pugh, who is white, replaced the Acting County Superintendent of Education, who was black.
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Flowers." App. 7a.~ The motive behind this investigation is a matter of dispute.
In his first report, sent on May 14, 2011, the
private investigator expressed his belief that at least
some of the students mentioned in the Lanett letters
did not live in the Troup High School attendance
zone. But the investigator exonerated Troup school
officials, including Flowers, stating that "any involvement of Troup County Staff in efforts to falsify
students’ residencies [sic] was ’unfounded.’" App. 7a.
The report "found no evidence that any Troup County
employee had helped students establish fraudulent
residences." App. 55a.
3. The Third Investigation of Flowers
In July 2011, the investigator notified the assistant superintendent that he had received a report
about a possible involvement by Flowers in arranging housing for a family whose sons had earlier
been on the football team. The two boys, Jalen and
Zanquanarious Washington, had been on the team in
the fall of 2010. In February 2011, after the football
season had ended, the boys’ mother, Shayla Washington, who had been renting another home in the
Troup High School attendance zone,7 applied for an
apartment at the Happy Hallow Apartments. Ric
Hunt, a co-owner of the apartment, assertedly told
Doc. 127, Exh. 23; Doc. 129, p. 57; Doc. 113, p. 44.
That first home was at 904 Avenue D in West Point, Georgia.

the detective that Flowers had called him on Ms.
Washington’s behalf and had paid her rent and
deposit with a check. In this same report to the
assistant superintendent, the detective noted that the
Washingtons had since moved away. They moved out
of Georgia, and the boys did not play on the Troup
High School football team thereafter.
Flowers did not learn of this accusation until he
was fired months later. "[A]t no time prior to the
meeting at which he was fired did anyone from the
School District speak with Flowers, which violated the
District’s policy of first giving warnings to employees
under investigation." App. 8a (footnote omitted). And
"Pugh ’made no attempt to verify the information’
provided by Ric Hunt, the co-owner of the apartment .... " App. 18a. "At no point in the investigation
did [the detective] or any other Troup County School
District official interview Shayla Washington directly." App. 8a.8
In September 2011, Pugh and the assistant
superintendent met with Hunt. Pugh took no further
action for four months. Then, in January 2012, Pugh
instructed the assistant to obtain a written statement
from Hunt. Finally, on February 16, 2012, Pugh met
with Flowers and told him he was being dismissed for
having paid the rent and/or deposit on the Washingtons’ apartment, and for calling Hunt to offer to
8 "Pugh o.. did [not] grant the private investigator’s request
to question [Ms.] Washington and Flowers."
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make those payments. Pugh did not assert that the
dismissal was based on any claim that Flowers had
engaged in improper activity prior to February 2011.
Flowers, who first learned of the charges only when
he was dismissed, denied having spoken with Hunt or
having paid the Washingtons’ rent or deposit. The
dismissal was to take effect on February 29.
4. The Final Termination Decision
Before the termination could become final, Flowers provided the defendants with information which
largely discredited the allegations on which Pugh
claimed to have relied.
The next day [following his dismissal], Flowers returned to Pugh’s office with Tseyonka
Davidson (one of the Washington brothers’
uncles) and his wife. Davidson provided
Pugh with a signed statement attesting that
he had paid the deposit and rent for the department. He also informed Pugh that he,
not Flowers, had made the phone call to
Hunt about securing the apartment. To back
up Davidson’s story, Flowers provided Pugh
with a statement from the resident manager
of Happy Hallow Apartments, who declared
that Davidson and [Ms.] Washington had
paid the deposit and rent.
App. 36a-37a. Because Hunt had asserted that Flowers had paid Washington’s rent with a check, the
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assistant superintendent emailed Hunt and asked for
a copy of the alleged check.9 Hunt never replied.
"[D]espite the evidence indicating that Hunt’s
statement was false, Pugh did not relent." App. 37a.
In light of the exculpatory information provided by
Flowers, and of Hunt’s failure to provide a copy of the
alleged check, Pugh now focused his attack on the
claimed telephone call from Flowers to Hunt.1° Pugh
insisted that on February 16, Flowers had admitted
making that call.11 (Flowers denied having made
either the call or any such admission. App. 12a). And
the alleged phone call would not necessarily have
provided a ground for dismissal, because it was not at
all clear that such a call would even violate the
applicable anti-recruiting rules. "Pugh called [the
Georgia High School Association’s] executive director,
to confirm that making a call to secure an apartment
for an athlete would be considered recruiting. Pugh
testified that [the director] said it would. But in his
affidavit [the director] state[d] that he never ’makes
decisions with regard to the application of the [Association’s anti-recruiting rules] by telephone.’" App.
54a.12

9 Doc. 133-2.
lo Doc. 113, p. 74.
11 Id., pp. 53-54.
12 "The contents of the Pugh-Swearngin telephone conversation ... are ... disputed by the parties." App. 12a n.6.
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Pugh decided to stand by his initial decision to
dismiss Flowers. The Board of Education then voted
to approve Flowers’ dismissal, "based upon the information and recommendation Superintendent Pugh
provided."13 Flowers’ employment ended on February
29. He was replaced by a white head football coacla.
C. Proceedings Below
Flowers commenced this action in the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging
that he had been dismissed because of his race, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Flowers contended, inter alia, that the school board’s
justification for the dismissal, the alleged "recruiting"
violation related to the Washingtons’ apartment, was
just a pretext. After a period of discovery, the district
court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. App. 28a-70a.
The court of appeals concluded that there was
indeed evidence that the reason given for firing
Flowers was a pretext. The evidence, it found, would
"support an inference that the School District’s investigation into Flowers’s potential recruiting violations
may have been pretext of something. The School
District’s ham-handed investigation and actions
singling out Flowers could lead a reasonable jury to
13 Doc. 108-6, p. 6.
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conclude that Pugh had it in for Flowers from the
beginning." App. 19a-20a (emphasis in original). The
appellate court set out some of the evidence that
suggested that the asserted recruiting violation was
not the defendants’ real reason for firing Flowers.
App. 18a-19a. The court of appeals noted that "[t]he
parties fiercely dispute the existence of, and the
meaning to be drawn from, many of the ins and outs
of the events leading to and following Flowers’s
termination." App. 3a.
But, the Eleventh Circuit held, even if the reason
given by school officials for firing Flowers was "a
bald-faced lie" (App. 22a), that would be legally
insufficient to support a finding of discrimination. In
an earlier era, the Eleventh Circuit had held that this
type of evidence could suffice to defeat a summary
judgment motion. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106
F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045
(1998). But, the court below explained, subsequent
Eleventh Circuit decisions had overturned Combs and
precluded proving discrimination in that manner.
At one time under this Circuit’s law, Flowers
could have gotten his claims before a jury after making a prima facie case and merely
contradicting the School District’s proffered
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. See
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, .... recognized
as modified, Chapman v. AI Transport, 229
F.3d 1012, 1025 n.ll (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). Intervening precedent has since closed
this avenue for Title VII plaintiffs. Contradicting the School District’s asserted reason
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alone, though doing so is highly suggestive of
pretext, no longer supports an inference of
unlawful discrimination .... "[A] contradiction
of the employer’s proffered reason for the
termination of an employee is sometimes
enough, when combined with other evidence,
to allow a jury to find that the firing was the
result of unlawful discrimination."
App. 22a-23a (quoting Kagor v. Takeda Pharm. Am.
Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012); emphasis
in opinion below). In Reeves, this Court had expressly
cited the decision in Combs - now repudiated by the
Eleventh Circuit - as an example of the line of cases
that conflicted with the Fifth Circuit in Reeves. 530
U.S. at 140.
Proof of the falsity of the particular explanation
actually given by a defendant is insufficient, the
Eleventh Circuit insisted, because such evidence does
not also disprove the "virtually limitless possible nondiscriminatory reasons" that might hypothetically
have been behind an employer’s action.
There are virtually limitless possible nondiscriminatory reasons why the Troup County
School District could have wanted to fire
Flowers .... [T]he school district, though not
believing that Flowers had committed recruiting violations, could have wanted a
football program free from the appearance of
impropriety. Or the School District could
have wanted to avoid an interstate kerfuffle
with school officials in Lanett, Alabama. Or
the School District could have wanted to
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make room for a new head coach - perhaps
even a new coach who would be more willing
to commit recruiting violations. Or the
School District could have simply grown
tired of Flowers. We just don’t know.
App. 21a (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the
Eleventh Circuit held, a plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case, prove the falsity of the defendant’s
proffered explanations, and then offer some additional evidence of discrimination.
Because ... Flowers has failed to put forth
any additional evidence that would support
an inference of unlawful discrimination, it is
insufficient for Flowers merely to make a
prima facie case and - assuming that he
could do so - call into question the School
District’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The burden placed on Title
VII plaintiffs to produce additional evidence
suggesting discrimination after contradicting
their employer’s reasons is not great, but
neither is it nothing.
App. 23a-24a.
The Eleventh Circuit denied a timely petition for
rehearing en banc. App. 127a-30a.
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
This case marks the resurgence in the Eleventh
Circuit of the pretext-plus doctrine long ago abandoned by the other courts of appeals. The Eleventh
Circuit has emphatically and expressly repudiated
that circuit’s "one time" rule that plaintiffs can
demonstrate discrimination by proving that an employer’s proffered justification for a disputed action is
a fabrication; in the Eleventh Circuit today proof that
an employer was guilty of even a "bald-faced lie" will
not suffice. The court below insists that this stringent
limitation on the permissible method of proving discrimination is mandated by Eleventh Circuit precedents from 2000 to 2012. A plaintiff cannot rely on a
prima facie case and proof of the falsity of an employer’s proffered reason, but must also adduce "additional evidence." That is precisely the rule applied by the
Fifth Circuit in Reeves, and rejected by this Court in
Reeves. The standard announced in the decision
below conflicts with Title VII decisions in every other
geographical circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit’s pointed explication of its
standard makes palpably clear that this standard is
incompatible with this Court’s precedents, and with
common sense. Proof that an employer’s reason is a
fabrication is insufficient, the court of appeals insisted, because it only rules out the reasons the
employer actually gave. Such proof fails to exclude
the "virtually limitless possible nondiscriminatory
reasons" which might instead have motivated an employer. App. 28a (emphasis added). In the Eleventh
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Circuit a plaintiff not only must disprove the reasons
an employer did give, but also must negate every
conceivable reason an employer might have given,
and even reasons that are the opposite of what the
employer actually asserted. Thus in this case, although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that Flowers
had adduced evidence that the defendants did not fire
Flowers because they believed he had violated a
recruiting rule, it faulted Flowers for failing to also
demonstrate that he was not fired for the opposite
reason, because the school board wanted a coach who
- unlike the scrupulous Flowers - "would be more
willing to commit recruiting violations." App. 2 la.
I.

THE DECISION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CONFLICTS WITH TITLE VII DECISIONS IN ALL TWELVE GEOGRAPHICAL
CIRCUITS

(1) The Eleventh Circuit holds in this Title VII
case that "it is insufficient for [a plaintiff] merely to
make a prima facie case and ... call into question the
[defendant’s] proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason." App. 23a-24a. Every other circuit applies the
opposite rule in Title VII cases.
The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
addressing the specific procedural posture of this
case, insist that a plaintiff in a Title VII case can
defeat summary judgment by the very type of showing that the Eleventh Circuit held insufficient. "Evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for the

18
termination was not the actual reason ... does not
mandate a finding for the employee, ... but it is
enough to survive summary judgment." Griffin v.
Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2012).TM "[A]
disparate treatment plaintiff can survive summary
judgment without producing any evidence of discrimination beyond that constituting his prima facie case,
if that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact
regarding the truth of the employer’s proffered reasons." Chuang v. University of California Davis, Bd.
of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).15
A plaintiff can withstand summary judgment
if she presents evidence sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the defendant’s articulated reason
for the adverse employment action is pretextual .... "Pretext exists when an employer
does not honestly represent its reasons .... "

See Moffatt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 624 Fed.Appx. 341,
350 (6th Cir. 2015) ("A plaintiff’s prima facie case, together with
evidence showing the employer’s proffered reason is false,
permits the jury to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.").
1~ Lespron v. Tutor ~me Learning Center, 550 Fed.Appx.
509, 510 (9th Cir. 2013) ("[o]nce a plaintiff raises a genuine issue
of material fact about the veracity of a defendant’s proffered
explanation, summary judgement is inappropriate; the question
of whether the ’real reason’ for the action was discrimination is a
question for the factfinder.").
14
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Konzak v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 492 Fed.Appx. 906,
910 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller v. Eby Realty
Group, LLC, 396 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2005)).1~
[T]o avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff’s
evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder
reasonably to infer that each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons
was either a post-hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered reason is a
pretext).
Abramson v. William Paterson College of New Jersey,
260 F.3d 265, 283 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Fuentes v.
Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).17
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have concluded
more generally in Title VII cases that a trier of fact
can infer the existence of an unlawful motive from
the existence of a prima facie case and the falsity of
an employer’s proffered reasons. "[T]he plaintiff’s
prima facie case, combined with ... evidence which is
16 Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2003) ("in cases
where the employer advances a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for an employment action, the plaintiff may survive
summary judgment by showing that the employer’s asserted
reason was pretextual.").
17 See Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 427 (3d Cir.
2013) ("the factfinder may infer from the combination of the
prima facie case, and its own rejection of the employer’s proffered reason, that the employer engaged in the adverse action
for an invidious reason.").
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sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the employer’s
proffered reason is false, permits the trier of fact to
infer that [the employer] discharged [the plaintiff] in
violation of Title VII .... "Siraj v. Hermitage in Northern
Va., 51 Fed.Appx. 102, 112 (4th Cir. 2002).is "IT]he
Supreme Court[ ] expl[ained in Reeves] that a factfinder may infer the ultimate fact of retaliation from
the falsity of the explanation." Gee v. Principi, 289
F.3d 342,348 (5th Cir. 2002).
The First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and District
of Columbia Circuits hold in Title VII cases that a
prima facie case combined with proof of the falsity
of an employer’s explanation will ordinarily, although not invariably, permit an inference of discrimination. "In Title VII cases, we have made clear
that summary judgment usually ’may be defeated
where "a plaintiff’s prima facie case combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false may permit the trier of
fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."’" Duzant v. Electric Boat Corp., 81
Fed.Appx. 370, 372 (2d Cir. 2003) (opinion joined by
Sotomayor, J.) (emphasis added; quoting Byrnie v.
Town of Cromwell, 243 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2001)). "A
plaintiff’s prima-facie case, combined with sufficient
18 Ham v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 158
Fed.Appx. 457, 463 (4th Cir. 2005) ("the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant’s proffered reason is mere pretext for discrimination .... This may be accomplished by showing that the
proffered reason is false....").
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evidence to find that an employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit a trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully [discriminated against]
the plaintiff." Rivera-Rodriguez v. Frito Lay Snacks
Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15, 27 (1st Cir. 2001); see Greene
v. Potter, 557 F.3d 765, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2009); Dixon
v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 578 F.3d 862,
869 (8th Cir. 2009); Evans v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 617,
621 (D.C.Cir. 2013).
(2) The linchpin of the Eleventh Circuit standard is that at least in Title VII cases plaintiffs
cannot avoid summary judgment by establishing a
prima facie case and demonstrating the falsity of an
employer’s proffered explanation; plaintiffs must also
offer "additional evidence" of discrimination. App.
23a-24a. Ten circuits have in Title VII cases expressly
rejected any such requirement of additional evidence.
In the First Circuit, "’introduction of additional
evidence is not necessarily required’ when the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing and adduces evidence of pretext." Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490,
498 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Dominguez-Cruz v. Shuttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 430 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000)).
In the Second Circuit, "it is ’err[or] [to] proceed[] from
the premise that a plaintiff must always introduce
additional, independent evidence of discrimination.’ ...
Thus, the District Court erred in holding that the
plaintiff’s proof that defendants’ explanation was
false was ’immaterial’ because she had not introduced
additional, independent evidence of discrimination."
Sands v. Rice, 619 Fed.Appx. 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2015)
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(quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 149). "[C]ircumstances in
which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence
beyond evidence establishing a prima facie case and
evidence permitting a finding that a proffered explanation was false ’in order to survive a motion for
judgment as a matter of law ... will be uncommon.’"
Duzant v. Electric Boat Corp., 81 Fed.Appx. 370, 372
(2d Cir. 2003) (opinion joined by Sotomayor, J.) (quoting Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251
F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001) and Reeves, 530 U.S. at
154 (Ginsburg, J. concurring)). And the Third Circuit
holds that "if a plaintiff has come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a finder of fact to discredit the
employer’s proffered justification, she need not present additional evidence of discrimination beyond her
prima facie case to survive summary judgment."
Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 427 (3d Cir.
2013).
The Fourth Circuit has made clear in a Title VII
case that "a plaintiff is not required to provide additional evidence that race was the true reason for the
employment decision." Burgess v. Bowen, 466 F.3d
272, 277 (4th Cir. 2012). That circuit has repeatedly
overturned district court decisions applying an additional evidence requirement in a Title VII case.19 In
~ Leake v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouse, 5 Fed.Appx. 228, 232
(4th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) ("the district court ... appl[ied] the ’pretext-plus’ standard. Under this standard, which
was the law of this circuit at the time the district court rendered
its decision, [the plaintiff] was required to demonstrate that the
explanation proffered by [the defendant] was pretextual and
(Continued on following page)
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the Fifth Circuit, if a Title VII plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case and shows that the employer’s
"explanation is false or unworthy of credence ... [,]
’[n]o further evidence of discriminatory animus is
required because "once the employer’s justification
has been eliminated, discrimination ... may well be
the most likely alternative explanation."’" Staten v.
New Palace Casino, LLC, 187 Fed.Appx. 350, 358 (5th
Cir. 2006). "If the plaintiff can show the employer’s
asserted justification is false, this showing, coupled
with a prima facie case, may permit the trier of fact
to conclude that the employer discriminated against
the plaintiff without additional evidence." Price v.
Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002);
see 283 F.3d at 721 n.4 ("[plaintiff] is not required to
present additional independent evidence of discrimination")
produce evidence (beyond his prima facie case) that the real
reason for his discharge was retaliation ... since the district
court decided this case, however, the Supreme Court has
rejected the pretext-plus standard. See Reeves...."); Crosland v.
Caldera, 2000 WL 1520597 at "1 (4th Cir. Oct. 13, 2000) ("We
vacate and remand because the district court relied upon this
Circuit’s ’pretext-plus’ case law, which has since been rejected by
the Supreme Court. Under this theory where a plaintiff has
already established a prima facie case of discrimination and the
employer has advanced an alleged legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its action, a plaintiff ..o must show ... something
additional .... [T]he Supreme Court rejected the ’pretext-plus’
approach° See Reeves....").
so Handzlik v. U.S., 93 Fed.Appx. 15, 19 (5th Cir. 2004)
("The Supreme Court has held that the trier of fact may infer
retaliation or discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s
(Continued on following page)
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The Sixth Circuit, applying the same standard in
Title VII cases, has repeatedly reversed district court
decisions which required a plaintiff to offer additional
evidence over and above a prima facie case and proof
of the falsity of an employer’s proffered reason.
The district court ... required [the plaintiff]
to introduce additional evidence beyond the
evidence necessary to support a prima facie
case and a showing of pretext in order to
survive summary judgment .... The district
court ... erred in assuming that [the plaintiff] had to produce additional evidence of
discrimination in order to survive summary
judgment.
Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 594 (6th Cir. 2012);
see Moffatt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 624 Fed.Appx.
341, 350 (6th Cir. 2015) ("No additional proof of
discrimination is required .... "); Carter v. Toyota Tsusho
America, Inc., 529 Fed.Appx. 601, 609-10 (6th Cir.
explanation .... The plaintiff need not, therefore, introduce additional evidence of discrimination in order to survive summary
judgment."); Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir.
2003) ("Evidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation
is false or unworthy of credence, taken together with the plaintiff’s prima facie case, is likely to support an inference of discrimination even without further evidence of defendant’s true
motive .... No further evidence of discriminatory animus is required because ’once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation....’") (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48); Gee v.
Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) ("In such cases, a
plaintiff may withstand a motion for summary judgment without adducing additional, independent evidence of retatiation.").
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2013) ("[T]o the extent prior case law suggests that to
survive summary judgment a plaintiff must do more
than sufficiently call into question the employer’s
proffered reasons for its employment decision, ... it is
no longer the law of this circuit in light of Reeves");
Layne v. Huish Detergents, Inc., 40 Fed.Appx. 200,
206-07 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[The plaintiff] was not required to submit additional evidence to reach a
threshold of sufficiency to support th[e] conclusion [of
retaliation]."); Livingston v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel
Corp., 2000 WL 1720630 at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2000)
("[B]ecause [the plaintiff] showed that the proffered
reason was insufficient to warrant a discharge, a factfinder would be permitted to infer that discrimination
was the true reason, and he was not required to
introduce additional direct evidence of discrimination."). In the Seventh Circuit as well, it is reversible
error to require a Title VII plaintiff to adduce such
additional evidence. Powell v. Rumsfeld, 42 Fed.Appx.
856, 859 (7th Cir. 2002). Similarly, in the Ninth
Circuit "the factfinder may infer ’the ultimate fact of
intentional discrimination’ without additional proof
once the plaintiff has made out her prima facie case if
the factfinder rejects the employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons as unbelievable." Noyes v. Kelly
Services, 488 F.3d 1163, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch.
Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003)).
The Tenth Circuit recognizes that a requirement
of "additional evidence" would recreate the pretextplus doctrine rejected in Reeves. "The plaintiff does
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not have to come forward with additional, direct
evidence of a discriminatory motive (sometimes referred to as ’pretext plus’)." Neal v. Roche, 349 F.3d
1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2003). "Under pretext-plus, the
plaintiff must do more than show pretext; [she] must
also come forward with additional, direct evidence of
a discriminatory motive .... This circuit has rejected
the pretext-plus doctrine." Konzak v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 492 Fed.Appx. 906, 910 n.2 (10th Cir.
2012) (quoting Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427
F.3d 1303, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005)); see McCowan v. All
Star Maintenance, Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 922 (10th Cir.
2001).21 And the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
summary judgment in a Title VII case because the
district court - like the Eleventh Circuit in the instant case - had held that "employment discrimination plaintiffs are presumptively required to submit
evidence over and above [evidence of pretext] in order
21 See Lundien vo United Airlines, 2000 WL 1786579 at *4
(10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2000):
[T]he district court applied an incorrect legal standard .... IT]he district court rule that even if plaintiff
had presented evidence that ... her demotion was
based on erroneous facts, she failed to establish pretext because she did not present "evidence indicating
that her demotion was motivated, at least in part, by
her gender." ... This is a "pretext-plus" test, which the
Supreme Court recently rejected in Reeves .... Because
a showing of pretext, in itself, is all that is required to
raise the inference of discriminatory intent, and no
additional showing of actual discriminatory animus is
necessary, the district court incorrectly evaluated
plaintiff’s evidence.
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to avoid summary judgment." Colbert v. Tapella, 649
F.3d 756, 759 (D.C.Cir. 2011) (quoting Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1293 (D.C.Cir. 1998)
(en banc); emphasis in Colbert).
(3) Under the standard established by the
Eleventh Circuit, proof that an employer deliberately
gave a false explanation for a disputed employment
action is inherently insufficient in a Title VII action
to provide a basis for a finding of unlawful motive. A
defendant is entitled to summary judgment, under
the decision below, "[e]ven if [its] purported explanation ... [is] a bald-faced lie." App. 22a.
All of the eleven other geographical circuits have
held in Title VII actions that proof that an employer’s
proffered reason is a lie is "particularly" probative,
and will ordinarily support an inference that the
employer lied in order to cover up an unlawful discriminatory purpose. Lockridge v. University of
Maine, 597 F.3d 464, 470 n.4 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting
St. Mary’s Honor Center); Chambers v. TRM Copy
Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 38 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting
St. Mary’s Honor Center); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Reeves); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center, Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Reeves); Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572,
580 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Reeves); Hicks v. SSP
America, Inc., 490 Fed.Appx. 781, 788 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center); Rudin v. Lincoln
Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712, 726 (7th Cir.
2005) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center); Torgerson v.
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City of Rochester, 605 F.3d 584, 597 (8th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Reeves); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421,
1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center); Robinson v. Cavalry Portfolio Services, 365
Fed.Appx. 104, 111 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting St.
Mary’s Honor Center); Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d
1341, 1347 (D.C.Cir. 1999) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor
Center). In these circuits, proof that the employer has
told an ordinary lie will usually suffice to defeat
summary judgment; bald-face lies are not required.
"When evidence indicates that an employer’s
proffered reason for taking an adverse action is false,
a factfinder can decide that the employer was lying to
mask its true unlawful purpose." Wells v. Colorado
Dept. of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1217-18 (10th Cir.
2003). "The jury can conclude that an employer who
fabricates a false explanation has something to hide;
that ’something’ may well be discriminatory intent."
Colbert v. Tapella, 649 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C.Cir. 2011)
(quoting Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,
1293 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
(4) Under the standard established by the
Eleventh Circuit, a plaintiff cannot avoid summary
judgment merely by demonstrating the falsity of the
particular nondiscriminatory justification actually
proffered by an employer; that evidence is insufficient
because it does not also rule out the "virtually limitless [other] possible discriminatory reasons" that
might explain the employer’s actions. Under the
decision below it is irrelevant that the employer itself
never claimed to have acted for any of those other
imaginable purposes.
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Seven circuits have quoted and applied in Title
VII cases the opposite rule, set out in Reeves, that
"once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in
the best position to put forth the actual reason for its
decision." 530 U.S. at 147. Zimmermann v. Associates
First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Reeves); Colussi v. Woodruff Family Services,
LLP, 173 Fed.Appx. 118, 122 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Reeves); Burgess v. Bowen, 466 F.3d 272, 277 (4th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Reeves); Ellerbrook v. City of
Lubbock, Texas, 465 Fed.Appx. 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Reeves); Kimble v. Wasylysyn, 439 Fed.Appx.
492, 497 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves); Imwalle v.
Reliance Medical Products, Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545
(6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Reeves); Harvey v. Office of
Banks and Real Estate, 377 F.3d 698, 711 (7th Cir.
2004) (quoting Reeves); Wells v. Colorado Dept. of
Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2003); see
Kovacevich v. Kent State University, 224 F.3d 906, 839
(6th Cir. 2000) (Gilman, J., concurring) ("[L]et us be
realistic. The most reasonable inference for jurors to
draw, once they disbelieve the defendant’s proffered
explanation for its actions, will ordinarily be that the
real reason the defendant acted as it did was illegal
discrimination.").
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding that summary
judgment can be based on the existence of the virtually unlimited merely "possible" alternative nondiscriminatory explanations conflicts as well with Title
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VII decisions in other circuits which insist that explanations other than that relied on by the defendant
are irrelevant unless conclusively established by
record evidence. "[T]his is certainly not the type of
case suggested by Reeves in which ’no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory.’ ... The record in this case does not conclusively
reveal some other, nondiscriminatory reason for [the
defendant’s] decision to discharge [the plaintiff]."
Siraj v. Hermitage in Northern Va., 51 Fed.Appx. 102,
112 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148).
Reeves ... preclude[s] us from ordering judgment as a matter of law when a defendant
has merely made a [non-conclusive] evidentiary showing [that some other motive may
have prompted its action]. That is, such a
judgment requires a more conclusive evidentiary showing by [the defendant] than the
mere presentation of circumstances suggesting possible alternatives to both discrimination and its proffered nondiscriminatory
reason ....
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center, Inc., 290
F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
"[T]he ’rare’ instances in which a showing of
pretext is insufficient to establish discrimination
[include] when the record conclusively reveals some
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s
decision .... "Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.ad 572, 578 (5th
Cir. 2003).
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[T]o overcome as a matter of law a finding
of discrimination based on pretext plus a
prima facie case a defendant must point to
evidence in the record clearly indicating that
for some reason, plaintiff’s evidence of pretext ... should not carry the weight normally
assigned to it under the general principles of
evidence law .... Columbia has not produced
the strong, independent evidence of a third
motive or alternative rationale that Reeves
requires to overcome a plaintiff’s proof of
pretext and prevail as a matter of law.
Weinstock v. Columbia University, 224 F.3d 33, 58-59
(2d Cir. 2000). The "virtually limitless" "possible" but
purely hypothetical nondiscriminatory explanations
are simply irrelevant in other circuits.
(4) Two circuits go even further, holding that in
a Title VII case a jury must be specifically instructed
that it can infer the existence of an unlawful motive
from a prima facie case and a finding that an employer’s proffered explanation is untrue.
In Smith [v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147
F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998)], the court held it to
be reversible error to fail to instruct the jurors that "they are entitled to infer, but need
not, that the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of
demonstrating intentional discrimination by
a preponderance of the evidence can be met
if they find that the facts needed to make up
a prima facie case have been established and
they disbelieve the employer’s explanation
for its decision." ... While the Magistrate
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Judge gave a variant of the Smith charge for
the ADA claim, she did not explicitly reiterate that point in the sex-discrimination
charge .... This was error in light of Smith.
Watson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 207 F.3d 207, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2000) (opinion by
Alito, J.).
A trial court must instruct jurors that if they
disbelieve an employer’s proffered explanation they may - but need not - infer that the
employer’s true motive was discriminatory....
[A] pretext instruction is ... required where ...
a rational finder of fact could reasonably find
the defendant’s explanation false and could
"infer from the falsity of the explanation that
the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose."
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d
1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Reeves). The Tenth
Circuit requires this instruction to assure that a jury
does not mistakenly assume that plaintiffs are obligated to adduce some type of additional evidence, the
very requirement mistakenly imposed by the Elew
enth Circuit in the instant case. Id.
The Ninth Circuit permits counsel for plaintiffs
to argue to the jury that it should infer the existence
of an unlawful motive from the falsity of an employ~
er’s proffered justification. Browning v. U.S., 567 F.3d
1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009).
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II. THE DECISION OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT IS CLEARLY INCORRECT
The Eleventh Circuit decision in this case is
palpably inconsistent with Reeves. The avowedly
precedent-setting standard adopted by the Eleventh
Circuit in this case is identical to the standard applied by the Fifth Circuit, and rejected by this Court,
in Reeves.
The Eleventh Circuit below held that "it is insufficient for [a plaintiff] merely to make a prima facie
case and ... call into question the [defendant’s] proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." App.
23a-24a. Reeves held, to the contrary, that "a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient
evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated." 530
U.S. at 148. The court below held that "[c]ontradicting
the [employer’s] asserted reason alone, though doing
so is highly suggestive of pretext, no longer supports
an inference of unlawful discrimination." App. 23a.
Reeves held, to the contrary, that "rejection of the
defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of
fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." 530 U.S. at 147 (emphasis in original).
The Eleventh Circuit held that "It]he burden [is]
placed on Title VII plaintiffs to produce additional
evidence suggesting discrimination after contradicting their employer’s reasons .... "App. 24a. Reeves held
that the Fifth Circuit in that case had "erred in
proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must
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always introduce additional, independent evidence of
discrimination." 530 U.S. at 149. That is precisely the
error made by the Eleventh Circuit in the instant
case.
The magnitude and gravity of the Eleventh
Circuit’s error is highlighted by its objection that
Flowers had failed to discredit "the virtually limitless
possible nondiscriminatory reasons why the Troup
County School District could have wanted to fire
Flowers." App. 21a. The Court below insisted it was
not sufficient that Flowers discredited the Board’s
actual proffered explanation that it fired Flowers for
violating recruiting rules; under the Eleventh Circuit
holding, Flowers was also required to discredit even
the opposite "possible ... reason[ ]" hypothesized by
the court of appeals, that the Board dismissed Flowers because it wanted "a new coach who would be
more willing to commit recruiting violations." App.
21a (emphasis in original).
Although Reeves concerned a claim under the
ADEA, while the instant case arises under Title VII,
the decisions cannot conceivably be distinguished on
that ground. The analysis in Reeves does not rest in
any way on the text or prior interpretations of the
ADEA. To the contrary, the threshold premise of
Reeves is that the standard governing the presentation and evaluation of a claim of intentional discrimination under the ADEA is the same as the standard
applicable to Title VII cases. 530 U.S. at 142. All of
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the Supreme Court precedents relied on in Reeves
were Title VII opinions.22 In describing the "conflict
among the Courts of Appeals" which certiorari was
granted to resolve, the Court referred without distinction to cases involving Title VII,23 the ADEA,~4 and
other statutes.2~ 530 U.S. at 140-41. Clearly Reeves
announced a standard applicable to all claims of
intentional discrimination, and emphatically applicable to Title VII.
The reasoning in Reeves is as applicable to claims
of race discrimination under Title VII as it is to
claims of age discrimination under the ADEA. The
Court explained that "once the employer’s justification
~ McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); St.
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks; Texas Dept. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978); U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
23 Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1045 (1998); Sheridan v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1129 (1997); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d
Cir. 1997) (en banc).
24 Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F.3d 1104
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 UoS. 946 (1994); Anderson v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (Tth Cir. 1994); Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.Cir. 1998) (en banc);
Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996);
Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1994).
25 Aka vo Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C.Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Americans With Disabilities Act); Theard v.
Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 1995) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Woods
v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1994) (state law
claim).
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has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the
most likely alternative explanation, especially since
the employer is in the best position to put forth the
actual reason for its decision." 530 U.S. at 147. Here,
as in Reeves, the trier of fact’s rejection of the employer’s proffered reason could well lead to the conclusion
that discrimination was the most likely alternative
explanation. Reeves recognized that proof that an
employer had lied about its motives would be substantial evidence of an attempt to hide an unlawful
purpose.26 Such mendacity is equally probative when
a trier of fact is assessing a claim of race discrimination, as in the instant case, or age discrimination, as
occurred in Reeves.

26 530 U.S. at 147 ("the factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the
elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination.") (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at
511):
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can
reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation
that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent
with the general principle of evidence law that the
factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty
about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of
guilt."
530 U.S. at 147 (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296
(1992)).
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the
Eleventh Circuit. Alternatively, the petition for a writ
of certiorari should be granted and the judgment
below summarily reversed.
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